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Recent Decisions
union is an instrumentality whose existence is justfied when it is utilized
to strengthen the bargaining status of its members vis-a-vis the employer
so that it may obtain those terms of employment conducive to its members' welfare in the give and take of collective bargaining 8 Where,
then, union action crosses the boundary beyond which a valid weapon
of self defense becomes a weapon of offense when applied against a
member, that member's Section 7 rights are violated and such action
must be proscribed.
The Board's holding that fining a member for filing a decertification
petition is a union unfair labor practice was a proper interpretation
of the relationship between the member's Section 7 rights and the
union's Section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso right. It is believed, nonetheless,
that the Board should not have relied on it's holding in Tawas Tube,
but should have grasped the opportunity to correct the possibly injurious effect on the union member's rights of that decision by stating
that suspension, not expulsion, was the proper union remedy.
Leonard Zapler

LAW-ABORTION STATUTE-DUE PRocEss-The Supreme
Court of California has held that a statute prohibiting abortions not
"necessary to preserve" the mother's life is so vague and uncertain as
to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
CRIMINAL

People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969).
Appellant-defendant, a physician and surgeon considered eminent in
the field of obstetrics and gynecology, was convicted of abortion in
violation of section 2741 and conspiracy to commit an abortion, a violaAct states in part: "It is the purpose and policy of this chapter . .. to protect the rights
(Emphasis
of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations.
added.).
33. Mr. Justice Black stated for the dissent in Allis-Chalmers:
Section 7 and 8 together bespeak a strong purpose of Congress to leave workers
wholly free to determine in what concerted labor activities they will engage or
decline to engage. This freedom of workers to go their own way in this field, completely unhampered by pressures of employers or unions, is and always has been a
basic purpose of the labor legislation now under consideration.
338 U.S. 175, 216.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (West 1955). This statute was amended in 1967 by what has
come to be called "The Therapeutic Abortion Act." This new enactment authorizes
an abortion if it takes place in an accredited hospital, is approved by a hospital staff
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tion of section 182 of the California Penal Code. 2 When the abortion
of concern was performed, section 274 read as follows:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman,
or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug or substance,
or uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with
intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless
the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in state prison not less than two nor more than five
years. 3
Appellant's conduct consisted of tendering to an unmarried couple
the phone number of a fellow physician, who although licensed to
practice in Mexico, had not secured a California license and had disclosed to the appellant that he would perform abortions. In defense
the appellant maintained that he had given the phone number only
because he believed the couple would stop at nothing in an attempt
to terminate the pregnancy. In substantiating this belief he testified
that the couple had threatened to go to Tijuana, Mexico, to have the
abortion performed, and that at one point in their discussion they
had stated that an abortion would be obtained "one way or another."
Apprehensive that any such action would endanger the woman's life,
the phone number was given by the appellant.
In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court held that the abortion statute was invalid as it was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. Justice Peters, speaking for the majority, concluded that
. . . the term "necessary to preserve" in section 274 of the Penal
Code is not susceptible of a construction that does not violate
legislative intent and that is sufficiently certain to satisfy due process requirements without
improperly infringing on fundamental
4
constitutional rights.

Relying on the accepted principle of statutory construction that a
statute, particularly a criminal enactment, must be of such certainty
and definiteness as to enable one to prejudge his conduct in conforcommittee consisting of at least three licensed physicians, and there is a "substantial
risk that continuance of pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health
of the mother"; if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest or if the woman is under
15 years of age. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 25950-25954 (West 1967). Dr. Belous was
convicted under Section 274 because the new law was not in effect when he was convicted.
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 182 (West 1955).
3. Id. § 274.
4. People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357, 458 P.2d 194, 197 (1969).
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mity with the requirements of the law," the majority concluded that
in this respect section 274 was deficient, and therefore was violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Analyzing the
phrase "necessary to preserve" semantically, the court deduced that
taken together these words expressed no clear meaning; and taken
separately they denoted nothing more definite. The primary contention of the State was that the phrase should be interpreted so that an
abortion could be performed only in instances where the woman would
die if it were not performed. In rebuttal the majority first concluded
that such a definition had not been recognized by the courts of California, Iowa or Minnesota. Secondly, it was decided that even if such
an interpretation were conceded, it would violate a woman's constitutional rights to life and to choose whether or not to bear children.
Prior to this decision the California Supreme Court twice had occasion to rule on the validity of this statute, and in each instance it was
reasoned that the argument of unconstitutionality due to vagueness
and uncerainty was untenable. In People v. Rankin6 the vagueness issue
was dismissed and validity affirmed. The portion of section 274 attacked
in that case was "procuring miscarriage." One of the allegations made
by the defendant was that these words lacked certainty and definiteness. However, after revealing various dictionary definitions the court
concluded that ". . . the phrase as used in the statute was sufficiently
explicit to inform persons of common intelligence and understanding
of the acts which were prohibited." Again in People v. Gallardo8 the
statute was not challenged solely on the vagueness issue; however, the
court did direct itself to the question and summarily concluded that
the statute was not invalid for uncertainty of meaning ". . . when its
words and phrases are construed according to the context and approved
usage, and technical words are given their peculiar meaning. .. "
As the preceding brief history reveals, the unconstitutionality of
section 274 has not been a challenge greatly litigated. The predominant
thrust of California decisional law, regardless of whether deliberate
or inadvertent, with respect to the abortion statute in comparatively
recent times has been toward a general "elucidation" and resultant
5. State v. Hill, 91 A.L.R.2d 750, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
6. 10 Cal. 2d 198, 74 P.2d 71, 73 (1937),
7. Id. at 200, 74 P.2d 73.
8. 41 Cal. 2d 57, 243 P.2d 532, rn.257 P.2d 29 (1952).
9. Id. at 62, 243 P.2d at 537.
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"liberalization" of the meaning of "necessary to preserve." The initial,
and most significant, holding in this regard was People v. Ballard.10 It
was established that "necessary to preserve" as used in the statute did
not mean the risk or peril to life had to be imminent but that it must
have been such that it was ". . . potentially present, even though its
full development might be delayed .. .Nor was it essential that the
doctor should believe that the death of the patient would be otherwise
certain . . ."1 In the Ballard case a woman had gone to a doctor and
stated that she thought she was pregnant; and if she was, it was the
result of illicit intercourse since her husband had had no access to her.
The woman was extremely nervous and upset and reported having
headaches and irregular menstrual periods. She had three children
and had suffered two miscarriages previously. Upon examination of
the patient the doctor further disclosed that the condition of the cervix
indicated that a situation of "inevitable abortion" was present; that it
was almost standard procedure to remove the tissue in such situations
since further complications could well have arisen had not the medical abortion been performed. The consequence of this decision was
that a doctor could now abort a pregnancy if he could show that the
termination of the pregnancy was necessary for health reasons. In light
of this the phrase "necessary to preserve her life" consequently had
been expanded. People v. Abarbanel12 extended this more liberal approach even further. Under the circumstances of that case the court
acquitted the doctor where he had performed the abortion only after
the abortee had been examined by two psychiatrists who had indicated
that an interruption of the pregnancy would be necessary to "save her
life from the possibility of suicide." There was some question as to
whether, in fact, the reports made by the psychiatrists concerning the
suicidal inclinations were well founded; however, the court reasoned
that:
When it is remembered that in People v. Ballard, the doctor alone
determined the subject's nervous and mental condition was such
as to justify the abortion although no special psychiatric skill on
his part appears, while here the record discloses that two qualified
psychiatrists recommended the therapeutic abortion and there is
no evidence that appellant disbelieved or doubted the validity of
10. 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959).
11. Id. at p. 811, 335 P.2d at 212. In this case the doctor was convicted of performing
two abortions; however, only one is of concern since the other involved the issue of
poice entrapment.
12. 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, - P.2d -, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965).
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these recommendations, we feel that People v. Ballard, requires a
reversal . ... 13
Although legal periodicals in recent years have been replete with
articles respecting the arrant imperfections of existing abortion laws
and the need for reform, 1 4 the response from state legislative bodies
has been no more than slightly encouraging. 15 The approach initiated
by the California Supreme Court could well set a precedent for further
affirmative judicial action in an attempt to accelerate legislative reform. 16 Currently there are 37 states which authorize abortion only
where it is "necessary to preserve" the woman's life. 17 In addition,
2 states imply the same license through decisional law; the respective
statutes being silent on the issue.'8 It would appear obvious that the
13. Id. at 34, - P.2d -, 48 Cal. Rptr. 339.
14. See: Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 285 (1966); Montjoy, Abortion and the Law: A Proposal for Reform
in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. REv. 834 (1969); Diller, The Unborn Child: Consistency in the
Law?, 2 SuFFOt U.L. REV. 228 (1968); Packer and Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A
Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417 (1959); Kutner, Due Process of
Abortion, 53 MINN. L. Rav. 1 (1969); Lucus, Federal Constitutional Limitation on the
Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730 (1968);
Quay, Justifiiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 395 (1961);
Morris, Criminal Law-Abortion-The Need for Legislative Reform, 57 KY. L.J. 555
(1969); Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE L. REV. 125 (1966).
15. Although several states have newly proposed legislation pending on the subject,
only California-CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 25950-25954 (1967); Colorado--CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 40, art. 2 § 50 (1967); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44.45 (1967);
Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (as amended July 1968); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1101, 1102 (as amended July 1, 1968) have actually enacted reform. Mississippi enacted a minor reform measure by adding rape to the existing "preservation of life"
defense, as situations in which abortion is permitted. MISS. CODE § 2223 (1966).
16. Since the decision in the Belous case, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia has held that the District of Columbia Code provision proscribing
the producing of an abortion unless "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life
or health" is also invalid for its failure to give that certainty which due process considers essential to a criminal statute. U.S. v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969). See,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); AEK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-301 (1964); CONN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1958); DES.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.10, 797.01 (1965); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 309-3, -4 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1964); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 436.020 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1965); MicI. STAT. ANN. § 28.204
(1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, -405 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201120 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 80-81 (1951); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 861 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1956).
18. Actually there are four states-Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey and
Louisiana-which have no express provision within their respective statutes which indicates an exception to the general prohibition of abortion. However, only Massachusetts
and New Jersey have case law which clarifies their position in regard to permissible abortions. In both these states the courts have concluded that abortions can be performed in
certain situations. State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490 (1956) is generally cited
as authority for the interpretation that "or without lawful justification . . ." as used in
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instant decision has, to some extent, cast the "shadow of constitutional
doubt" on all these enactments. Essentially, if this approach is adhered
to by the courts of other jurisdictions, the judiciary would act as a
catalyst in hastening reform. By invalidating existing legislation a void
is created which can only be filled, hopefully, by the passage of reform
measures. This would be the desire and expectation of reformers; however, it is obvious that this entire theory is premised on the subsequent
passage of true reform.
Pennsylvania is among the states whose abortion statutes are silent
concerning how and in which situations permissible therapeutic abortion may be performed. 19 The only conduct proscribed is that which
is "unlawfully" performed; however, the statutes are entirely devoid of
20
a definition of what "unlawfully" means, as is also the decisional law.
Under such circumstances it would appear that the Pennsylvania law
the statute permits abortion where it is necessary to avoid the death or permanent,
serious injury to the mother. See N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953). Commonwealth
v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944) and Commonwealth v. Brunnelle,
341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1961) concluded that "unlawfully" as used in the
Massachusetts statute allows abortion where the physician in good faith believes it to be
necessary to save the patient's life or to prevent serious impairment of her mental or
physical health. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956).
Louisiana has been excluded since although the abortion statute is completely silent
as to the performance of any lawful abortions, the general Louisiana licensing provision
states that a physician who performs an abortion on a woman whose life is in Pperil
cannot be convicted if such is accomplished after consultation with another physician.
See LA. REv. STAT. § 37:1285 (1950) and LA. REv. STAT. § 14:87 (Supp. 1964).
19. There are two Pennsylvania statutes on abortion. Section 4718 makes it a felony
to merely attempt an abortion. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963). Commonwealth v.
Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 568, 116 A. 2d 751, 1955. Section 4719 does nothing more than
impose a greater punishment in the event the attempt results in the death of the woman
or the unborn child. PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719 (1963).
Section 4718 provides that:
Whoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, unlawfully administers to her any poison, drug, or substance, or unlawfully uses any instrument, or
other means, with the like intent, is guilty of felony, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000), or
undergo imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement at labor not excluding
five (5) years, or both. [Emphasis added.]
Section 4719 states:
Whoever unlawfully administers to any woman, pregnant with child, or supposed
and believed to be pregnant or quick with child, any drug, poison, or other substance, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means, with the intent to procure
the miscarriage of such woman, resulting in the death of such woman, or any child
with which she may be quick, is guilty of felony, and upon conviction thereof shall
be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding six thousand dollars ($6,000), or undergo
imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement at labor not exceeding ten (10)
years, or both. [Emphasis added.]
20. A review of the Pennsylvania case law disclosed no decision establishing in which
instances an abortion may be performed with impunity. However, 1 C.J.S. Abortion
§ 13 states that ". . . it has been intimated that an exception of necessity to save the
mother's life exists although the statute expressly makes no such exception." See Trout,
Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 184-86 (1964) for a discussion on the status of the Pennsylvania abortion law.
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on abortion is far more vague and less definite than even the California statute nullified in the instant decision.
Whether the California Supreme Court stands on firm ground in
basing its decision on the vagueness or certainty and definiteness
"principle" is debatable. That such a rule of statutory construction
exists and is well recognized as a guarantee of due process is unequivocal; 21 however, such an approach is vulnerable to the argument that
few words, if any, really have fixed, certain and definite meanings. The
test of definiteness and certainty, itself, as a constitutional requirement
of due process might be considered indefinite and uncertain in that
the final determination of the rule as it is applied to any words or
phrases will be directly dependent upon the subjective opinions and
22
prejudice of the judges before whom the issue is raised.
Although perhaps of secondary significance in the court's holding,
but possibly of equal or greater importance in future considerations
of the constitutional invalidity of abortion laws, is the recognition by
the majority of a woman's fundamental right to choose whether to
bear children.2 3 In acknowledging this right the court has extended
a legal trend of relatively recent genesis that a right of privacy exists
which places certain matters related to marriage, family and sex beyond the permissible interference of the state.2 4 It was upon this "right
21. Supra note 5.
22. For a thorough discussion of the certainty requirement see Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 194 CORNELL L. REV. 195 (1955).
23. People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (1969).
24. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The recognition of the constitutional right of a woman to choose whether or not she
desires to bear children, came to the forefront in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). In this case the appellants were the executive secretary of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut and its medical director, a licensed physician. They had been
convicted as accessories for giving married people information and medical advice on
how to prevent conception and, following an examination, prescribing a contraceptive
device for the wife's use. The Connecticut abortion statute makes it a crime for anyone
to use any drug or article to prevent conception. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-32 and
54-196 (1958). The United States Supreme Court, Justice Douglas speaking for the Court,
concluded that the statutes violated the right of marital privacy which exists within the
penumbra of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments which are made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. It has
been contended that:
[T]he only factual difference between the acts forbidden by the Connecticut statute
and acts forbidden by abortion laws is that ovum and spermatozo6n which can be
kept apart under Griswold's holding have come together and have begun to grow
into an embryo. Lucus, Federal Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730, 763 (1968).
To many this factual distinction is of major consequence, and more than a slight triviality.
Whether this fundamental right is to attain major significance in the "pudge" of other
abortion statutes in the future, will undoubtedly depend on whether the individual
judges involved are willing to "bridge" the factual "gap" between abortion and contra-
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of privacy" that the California Supreme Court intimated the constitutional right of the woman to choose whether or not to bear children. This right was raised as dictum in the majority opinion, and
therefore its immediate significance was not controlling.25 It is submitted, however, that in view of the recent preoccupation of the judiciary with individual right, the more concrete and readily defendable
approach in invalidating abortion statutes, is the "fundamental right"
argument. Should this approach be adopted there is no abortion law
that would not be susceptible to constitutional scrutiny and resultant
abrogation.
[Author's Note:
Subsequent to the writing of this note, but prior to publication,
activity has increased markedly in the field of abortion law. This recent
development has been experienced on both the legislative and judicial
levels of influence. The United States District Court of the District of
Columbia in United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969),
held D.C.'s ban on abortion invalid for vagueness, citing People v.
Belous, in support of such conclusion. The statute in this jurisdiction
prohibited abortion in all situations except where ". . . the same were
done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health
.... " D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961). As in the California case the
court in its discussion raises the issue of the woman's constitutional
right to decide for herself whether to bear children. However, once
again it was not the point upon which the court chose to "hang its
hat." Regarding the vagueness issue it was noted that "[t]he physician
in this instance is placed in a particularly unconscionable position
under the conflicting and inadequate interpretations of the D.C. abortion statute now prevailing."
The U.S. District Court for Eastern Wisconsin in another recently
decided case, declared the Wisconsin abortion law invalid on the
basis of the court's belief that, under the Ninth Amendment, the deception. For other discussions and analysis of the Griswold case see, Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv.219 (1966); Leavy and Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis, Therapeutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHio S. L.J. 647, 672 (1966); Allan, ConstitutionalAspects of Present Criminal
Abortion Law, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 102, 111 (1968).

25. The majority raised the right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear children in answer to the State's contention that the phrase "necessary to preserve her life"
should be construed to mean there would be certainty of death otherwise. However, this
answer was only proposed after the Court had already resolved that the law was invalid
for vagueness.
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cision whether to abort an unquickened fetus is the woman's and not
the state government's. It was held that the state does not have enough
of an interest in preventing abortions to justify the invasion of
privacy of the individual involved. The statute examined was worded
similarly to those found unconstitutionally vague in People v. Belous
and U.S. v. Vuitch; however, here the court expressly stated that it
did not find the law unconstitutionally vague. As thus analyzed the
case would appear to lend credence to the theory proposed in the body
of this article that this constitutional right of the individual is the
better basis for future judicial invalidation. While obviously one case
does not make a trend, it would appear that the seed sewed in Belous
and Vuitch has sprouted in the Wisconsin decision. Babbitz v. McCann, 38 U.S.L.W. 2498 (March 5, 1970). See also Wis. STAT. § 940.04
(1963).
Recent activity has developed in the respective state legislatures
throughout the country. Whether as a coincidence or consequence,
following People v. Belous various legislative bodies have been very
active in proposing, and in at least two instances enacting, real reform.
As of this writing Maryland and Arizona are close to enacting new legislation, and New York and Hawaii have, in fact, enacted new reform.
The new Hawaiian statute makes abortion strictly a matter between a
woman and her doctor; imposes no need to satisfy criterion such as
threat to life, health, etc.; but does impose a ninety day residency requirement. N.Y. Times, March 12, 1970, at 21. New York went a step
further than Hawaii in its new law in that there is no requirement of
residency whatsoever. Under this recent measure abortion remains
strictly a matter between a woman and her doctor up to the twentyfourth week of pregnancy. After the twenty-fourth week abortion
would be allowed only to save the woman's life. N.Y. Times, April 11,
1970 at 1.
As stated in the article, the judicial and legislative reaction to the
mounting tide for abortion reform prior to the Belous decision was
marked by indifference at best. It is submitted that the rapid and
rather sudden developments in this area in recent months have been
the result of the impetus provided by this holding. In this respect the
case represents the proverbial hole in the dike; and if this subsequent
five month history is any indication, the resulting break is growing
rapidly.]
Gary R. Cassavechia
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FEDERAL INCOME TAx-SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP

GRANTs-The

Supreme Court of the United States has held that payments received
by an employer based on salary and family size during an "educational
leave" to complete a Ph.D. dissertation on a topic approved by the
employer are not excludable from gross income as "scholarships or
fellowships" under Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
Respondent-taxpayers, employees of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, participated in a Ph.D. fellowship program sponsored by their
employer. They were permitted to take an educational leave' and
devote full attention to fulfilling the dissertation requirement 2 for
their doctorates. As students, respondents received tuition, incidental
expenses8 and a percentage 4 of their prior salaries plus "adders", depending upon the size of their respective families from Westinghouse.
They also retained their seniority status at Westinghouse and received
all employee benefits. In order to take advantage of the fellowship
program, the respondents were required to sign a written agreement
by which they became obligated to return to their former employment
for a period of at least two years. 5
The respondents filed a claim for refund of the taxes withheld from
their monthly family allowance which was paid under the written
agreement by their employer. The claim was based on the grounds
that the payments were excludable from gross income as a scholarship
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 117.6 Upon rejec1. Respondents Johnson and Pomerantz took nine months leave and Respondent
Wolfe took twelve months.
2. The dissertation topic was required to be approved by the employer. It was approved if the topic had at least some general relevance to the work done by the employer.
3. Tuition and incidental fees were also paid by the employer, but no withholding
was made from those payments, and their tax status is not at issue in the case. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1956).
4. Respondents Johnson and Pomerantz received 80 percent of their prior salaries$5,670 each and Respondent Wolfe received 90 percent amounting to $9,698.90.
5. Respondent Wolfe began his leave at a time when the employer did not require
an agreement in writing to the two year return commitment. He was formally advised
before he went on leave, however, that he was "expected" to return to his employment
for a period of time equal to the duration of the leave, and in fact honored that obligation.
6. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954 provides in part that:
(a) In the case of an individual, gross income does not include(1) any amount received(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution, or
(B) as a fellowship grant .
(b) Limitations(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.-In the case of individuals who
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tion of the claims, respondents instituted a suit against the District
Director of Internal Revenue. At the trial, the jury was instructed
in accordance with the interpretation given to Section 117 by the Internal Revenue Service.7 The jury returned a verdict against the respondents and review was then sought. On appeal to the third circuit,8
the verdict of the trial court was reversed and the regulation was held
invalid.
The court of appeals reasoned that since Section 117(b) contained
certain limitations, no additional restrictions could be put on the basic
exclusion from income granted by subsection (a).9 In addition, it was
held that the legislative history underlying Section 117 indicated that
Congress wished to eliminate the case by case determination of the
treatment to be afforded to scholarships and that the primary purpose
are candidates for degrees at an educational institution subsection (a) shall
not apply to that portion of any amout received which represents payment
for . . . services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (1956) reads as follows:
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117:
(a) Educational and training allowances to veterans. Educational and training allowances to a veteran pursuant to section 400 of the Servicemen's Readjustment
Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 287) or pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 1631 (formerly section 231 of the
Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952.)
(b) Allowances to members of the Armed Forces of the United States. Tuition and
subsistence allowances to members of the Armed Forces of the United States or
approved by the United States for their education and training, such as the United
States Naval Academy and the United States Military Academy.
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of the
grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount paid or allowed
to, or on the behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research, if
such amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future employment
services or represents payment for services which are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him
to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor. However,
amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or
fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117 if the primary purpose of the education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and the amount
provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Neither the
fact that the results of his studies or research may be of some incidental benefit to
the grantor shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character of such
amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
8. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968).
9. The court of appeals relied on a canon of construction--expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule
or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are
excluded.
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of the section was the encouragement of financial aid to education
through tax relief.'0
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict and to examine for the first time Section 117 of the Internal
Revenue Code and the interpretation given to it by Treasury Regulation 1.1 17-4(c). It was found that the decision of the court of appeals
was in direct conflict with the decisions of other circuits." The Court
admitted that Congress' express reference to the limitations in Section
117(b) lends some support to the respondents' position. 12 Nevertheless,
the court pointed out the flaw in that position and said:
The difficulty with that position, however, lies in its implicit assumption that those limitations are limitations on an exclusion
of all funds received by students to support them during the
course of their education. Section 117 provides, however, only
that amounts received as "scholarships" or "fellowships" shall be
excludable. 3
The Supreme Court clearly stated that before the Section 117(b) limitations will be applied it must first be determined that the amounts in
question are scholarships. At this point some difficulty arises since Section 117 does not define scholarships or fellowships. However, Treasury
Regulations 1.117-3'1 and 1.117-41" supply the necessary definitions.
The instant case is an attack upon the definitions supplied by the Commissioner in 1. 117-3 and more specifically upon the limitations set out
10. H.R. RE'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954); See also, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
11. See, Reese v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Stewart v. U.S., 363 F.2d
355 (6th Cir. 1966); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Ussery v.
U.S., 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
12. Note 9 supra.
13. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 743 (1969).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1956) reads as follows:
(a) Scholarship. A scholarship generally means an amount paid or allowed to or
for the benefit of, a student whether an undergraduate or a graduate, to aid such
individual in pursuing his studies. The term includes the value of contributed
services and accommodations (see paragraph (d) of this section) and the amount
of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are furnished or remitted to a student to aid him in pursuing his studies. The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family allowance as a part of a scholarship. However,
the term does not include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative,
friend, or other individual in pursuing his studies where the grantor is motivated
by family or philanthropic considerations. If an educational institution maintains
or participates in plan whereby the tuition of a child of a faculty member of such
institution is remitted by any other participating educational institution attended by
such child, the amount of the tuition so remitted shall be considered to be an
amount received as a scholarship.
15. Note 7 supra.

450

Recent Decisions
in section 1.117-4(c). 16 The Court upheld the validity of the attacked
Regulations holding:
Here, the definition supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima
facie proper, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of "scholarships" and "fellowships" as relatively disinterested,
"no strings" educational grants, with no requirement of any sub7
stantial quid pro quo from the recipients.'
The Court pointed out that the Regulation represents an effort by
the Commissioner to define "scholarships" and "fellowships." Furthermore, since the Commissioner is charged with the administration of the
Code, the Regulations "must be sustained unless unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes," and "should not be
overruled except for weighty reasons."' 8 The Court also cited Ussery
v. United States,' 9 in which Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c) was explicitly sustained in a situation in which the payments were similar
to those received by the respondents.
The Court did not accept respondent's argument that the legislative
history underlying section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code indicates
a Congressional intent to eliminate a case by case determination with
respect to scholarships and fellowships. The primary purpose of section
117 as announced by the court of appeals was also rejected. 20 In answer
to those contentions the Supreme Court said that the legislative history
underlying section 117 is "far from clear." The Court went on to resolve the conflict between the legislative history and Treasury Regulation 1. 117-4 by saying that no conflict really existed. The Court said:
One may justifiably suppose that the Congress that taxed funds
received by "part-time" teaching assistants, presumably on the
ground that the amounts received by such persons really represented compensation for services performed, would also deem
proper a definition of "scholarship" under which comparable sorts
case, are signifiof compensation-which often, as in the present
2
cantly greater in amount-are likewise taxable. '
16. Note 7 supra.
17. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 US. 741, 743 (1969). That the Commissioner is charged
with administration of the code and that the Regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statute see, Commissioner v. South
Texas Lumber Co., 333 US. 496, 501 (1948), and U.S. v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
18. Id.
19. 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
20. The court of appeals said: ". .. the primary purpose of the section 117 exclusion
is to encourage financial aid to education through tax relief." 396 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir.
1968) 394 U.S. 744 (1969).
21. The House version of § 117(b)(1) taxed only amounts received as payment for
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The Court in effect said that section 117b(1)2 indicates a Congressional
intent to tax amounts received as compensation. This section excludes
payments received for teaching, research, or other services in the nature
of part time employment required as a condition to receiving the
scholarships or fellowship grant unless such services are required of
all candidates as a condition to receiving a degree. The reasoning of
the court is that since the services are required as a condition to receiving a scholarship, the grant is compensation because it is given
in exchange for a quid pro quo and therefore the grant should be in
gross income.
Despite the attacks on section 117 by legal scholars, 23 the Court
stamps its imprimatur upon the pre-1954 gift-compensation test. If
compensation can be found, the grant will be held includable in gross
income. As a result of this decision the courts will continue to use the
tests applied in Ussery. It is submitted that the problem of determining
which grants are taxable and which are not taxable is not governed by
a satisfactory standard. Treasury Regulation Section 1.117-4(c) further
confuses the issue in providing for a primary purpose test. How is the
primary purpose to be determined? Many grants can be to the benefit
of the grantor and the grantee and in equal proportions. Such a situation seems to strip the primary purpose test of its effect. Thus, the need
for a case by case determination must continue and certainty and predictability will be severely limited.
Joseph C. Visalli
teaching and research services. The Senate amended the provision, however, to include
payments for other services as well. See S. Rr. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
22. Note 13 supra.
23. See, Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury
Policy, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 144 (1960); Heckerling, The Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Present and Proposed, 27 OHIO S.L.J., 117, 131 (1966); Tabac, Scholarships
and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-Round, 46 TAXES 485 (1968); Weiss,
Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants, 1963 DUKE L.J. 488 (1963); Comment,
Exclusion of Fellowship Grants from Gross Income, 1967 U. OF Iii.. L.F. 326 (1967).
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